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I.

INTRODUCTION

Amidst now common reports of global heating, glacier melt,
sea level rise, ocean acidification, species extinction, persistent
droughts, and other consequences of human greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, the 2015 United Nations Conference on
Climate Change brought unprecedented international media
attention to the planet’s climate crisis. Although the resulting
accord ultimately fell short of presenting an adequate and
substantive response, the Conference of Parties held in Paris
(COP21) underscored the urgency at hand.1 Scientists have
been predicting staggering damage to our lives and
environment from climate change for some time.2 A recent
report of the U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program
says unequivocally: “Climate change, once considered an issue
for a distant future, has moved firmly into the present. . . .
Precipitation patterns are changing, sea level is rising, the
oceans are becoming more acidic, and the frequency and

1. For a declaration of climate urgency by scientists, see Brief for Scientists as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Reversal at 15–16, Alec L. ex rel.
Loorz v. McCarthy, No. 13–5192, 2014 WL 3013301 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief for Scientists], http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/
FiledScienceAmicus.pdf (“Effective action remains possible, but delay in undertaking
sharp reductions in emissions will undermine any realistic chance of preserving a
habitable climate system, which is needed by future generations no less than by prior
generations.”).
2. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, OVERVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 4 (2014), http://
nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/overview/overview.
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intensity of some extreme weather events are increasing.”3 The
year 2015 closed as the hottest year on record.4 The failure of
international climate negotiations to adequately address
climate disruption presents an unsettling backdrop for the
ever-increasing clarion calls from the scientific community
urging robust, decisive action. As Dr. James Hansen, former
Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies,
stated: “[F]ailure to act with all deliberate speed in the face of
the clear scientific evidence of the danger functionally becomes
a decision to eliminate the option of preserving a habitable
climate system.”5
This Article spotlights a recent Washington case, Foster v.
Washington Department of Ecology, which breaks new judicial
ground in forcing governments to control dangerous GHG
emissions. The case is part of an urgent global litigation
campaign known as Atmospheric Trust Litigation (ATL). The
Article begins by summarizing the actions deemed necessary
by scientists to avert climate catastrophe, and describes the
ATL campaign that formed in response. Part II explains the
public trust framework, which provides the legal foundation for
this climate litigation. Part III examines the three stages of
atmospheric trust cases and describes the litigation up until
the Foster decision. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Foster
decision for its path-breaking role and potential effect on the
ATL climate campaign as a whole.

3. Id. See also Brief for Scientists, supra note 1, at 15–16 (“Amici Scientists warn of
climate change impacts including . . . floods, storms, fires, and droughts.”); KOKO
WARNER ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT iv, 2 (2009), http://ciesin.columbia.edu/
documents/ClimMigr-rpt-june09.pdf (discussing the effects of climate change on
human migration globally).
4. See Dwayne Brown & Michael Cabbage, NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal RecordShattering Global Warm Temperatures in 2015, NASA (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.
nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal-record-shattering-global-warmtemperatures-in-2015. Earth has already warmed about 0.8ºC over the past century.
James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of
Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and Nature, 8 PLOS
ONE e81648, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Climate Prescription], http://www.plosone.org/
article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.
0081648&representation=PDF.
5. Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7,
Alec L. v. Jackson, No. C–11–2203 EMC, 2011 WL 8583134 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief], https://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/
files/Hansen%20Amicus%20.pdf.
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A.

Climate Crisis and the Scientific Prescription to Restore
Balance

Carbon dioxide pollution not only disrupts the planet’s
climate system but also imperils the world’s oceans. The
oceans operate as natural carbon “sinks” absorbing carbon
dioxide (CO2). This absorption causes a series of chemical
reactions in marine water and results in ocean acidification.6
In fact, since the Industrial Revolution, about one-third of
human carbon emissions have been absorbed by the oceans,
and unsurprisingly, the oceans are now thirty percent more
acidic.7 Ocean acidification threatens biodiversity, fisheries,
and aquaculture, undermines the food security of millions of
people, and jeopardizes tourism and other sea-related
economies.8
Atmospheric energy imbalances also warm the oceans. In
the annual 2014 State of the Climate Report, United States’
government scientists reported record warming on the surface
and upper levels of the oceans, with the Pacific Ocean
registering four to five degrees Fahrenheit above normal.9 The
oceans absorb more than ninety percent of man-made heat
energy driving global warming. The rate of heat absorption has
doubled since 1997.10 To put the matter into staggering
perspective, half of the approximately 300ZJ11 of total heat
energy absorbed by the planet since 1865 is attributable to the

6. For a discussion of the ocean’s acidification process, see A Primer on pH, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/A+primer+on+pH
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016). See also What is Ocean Acidification?, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/acidification.html (last visited
May 12, 2016).
7. See What is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 6 (percent increase in ocean acidity).
8. See The Ocean Portal Team, Ocean Acidification, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM
NAT. HISTORY, http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-acidification (last visited May 12, 2016).
9. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Warming of Oceans Due to Climate Change is
Unstoppable, Say US Scientists, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2015), http://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/16/warming-of-oceans-due-to-climate-changeis-unstoppable-say-us-scientists.
10. See Seth Borenstein, The Amount of Man-Made Heat Energy Absorbed by the
Seas has Doubled Since 1997, a Study Released Monday Showed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-01-19/
study-man-made-heat-put-in-oceans-has-doubled-since-1997.
11. One zettajoule (ZJ) is the equivalent of one billion terajoules (TJ) or 278 billion
megawatt hours (Mwh).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/14

4

Wood and Woodward: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a He

2016]

ATL: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AT LAST

637

last eighteen years.12 Associated Press reporter Seth
Borenstein makes this analogy: in the last eighteen years
alone, “Earth’s oceans have absorbed man-made heat energy
equivalent to a Hiroshima-style bomb being exploded every
second for seventy-five straight years.”13
This marine warming brings devastating consequences for
coral reefs, the oceans’ “rainforests.”14 In 2015, half of the
corals in the Caribbean Sea died after warming waters sparked
a massive bleaching event, and U.S. scientists predict that the
warm temperatures of 2016 will cause an additional sixpercent loss of coral reefs worldwide in that year alone.15 A
survey conducted in early 2016 of Australia’s Great Barrier
Reef reinforces the U.S. scientists’ predictions, finding that
ninety-three percent of Australia’s reefs are already bleached,
with the northern reefs suffering nearly fifty percent coral
death.16
More recently, scientists have discovered significant oxygen
depletion as a result of this heating.17 Overall, with each
degree increase in ocean temperature, the oxygen
concentration in the water decreases by two percent.18
Additionally, higher water temperatures decrease the rate of
ocean circulation, causing stratification where the oxygen-rich
upper layers mix less with the oxygen-depleted deeper layers.19
Over the past ten years, oxygen levels in the deep waters off
the southern coast of California have decreased by twenty

12. See Borenstein, supra note 10. By comparison, two ZJ is the equivalent of
detonating an atomic bomb (the size dropped on Hiroshima) every single second for a
full year. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Karl Mathiesen, 15,000 sq. km of Coral Reef Could be Lost in Current Mass
Bleaching, Say Scientists, THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/jul/07/six-percent-of-worlds-coral-could-be-lost-in-current-massbleaching-say-scientists.
15. Id.
16. See Chris Mooney, ‘And Then We Wept’: Scientists Say 93 Percent of the Great
Barrier Reef Now Bleached, WASH. POST (April 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/04/20/and-then-we-wept-scientists-say-93percent-of-the-great-barrier-reef-now-bleached/?tid=hybrid_experimentrandom_1_na.
17. See Niina Heikkenen, Ocean’s Oxygen Running Low, ‘Sobering’ Study Finds,
CLIMATE WIRE (May 2, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2016/05/02/stories/
1060036547.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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percent.20 While higher temperatures slow the rate of ocean
circulation, the warmer waters also boost the metabolism of
marine life, increasing their need for oxygen, and thereby
further exacerbating the devastating effects of the warming
ocean on marine ecology.21
Because humans today are both increasing carbon emissions
into the atmosphere and also destroying the planet’s natural
carbon sinks, the forests and oceans, the Earth’s climate
system has lurched into a perilous imbalance.22 The dual,
worsening crises of climate disruption and dying oceans cannot
find relief without slashing greenhouse gas emissions across
the globe. Though considerable climate harm is irrevocably
underway, many leading scientists say it is still possible to
restore climate equilibrium over the long term. Such an effort
requires reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to 350
parts per million (ppm), the uppermost level to limit total
average planetary heating to a safe zone of one degree
Celsius.23 In 2010, recognizing the need to quantify—for
policymakers, judges, and citizens—the emissions reduction
necessary to stay within the safe zone, NASA’s chief climate
scientist, Dr. James Hansen, convened an international team
of scientists to create a climate prescription for the planet.24
The resulting prescription addresses both carbon emissions
and the planet’s natural carbon absorption mechanisms, as
they are inextricably linked. The first part of the climate
prescription calls for a dramatic slash of carbon emissions well
beyond those targeted at COP21. The prescription presents a
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See The Ocean Portal Team, supra note 8.
23. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 13. In defining such a zone, the team
aimed for carbon levels present during the Holocene period in which human
civilization developed. See id. at 8 (“Warming of 1ºC relative to 1880–1920 keeps global
temperature close to the Holocene range, but warming of 2ºC, to at least the Eemian
level, could cause major dislocations for civilization.”); id. at 5 (discussing 350 target);
id. at 10 (“keeping global climate close to the Holocene range requires a long-term
atmospheric CO2 level of about 350 ppm or less”). Other research institutions refer to a
1.5ºC trajectory as the most cautionary path that remains technically feasible. See
PAUL BAER ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THREE SALIENT GLOBAL MITIGATION
PATHWAYS ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF THE IPCC CARBON BUDGETS (2013), http://sei-us.org/
Publications_PDF/SEI-DB-2013-Climate-risk-emission-reduction-pathways.pdf
(comparing the risks associated with a 1.5ºC increase, a 2.0ºC increase, and the
increase outlined at the G8 conference of 2009).
24. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4.
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trajectory, or “glidepath,” of annual emissions reduction
towards an ultimate goal of near-zero emissions.25 The team
stated that global emissions reduction of six percent annually,
beginning in year 2013, was required to reach 350 ppm by the
end of the century.26 Delaying reduction in carbon emissions
sharply increases the level of necessary yearly reductions—to a
point at which the reductions ultimately become too steep to
plausibly salvage a habitable planet.27 For example, the
Hansen team estimated that, had concerted action started in
2005, emissions reduction of just 3.5% a year could have
restored equilibrium by the end of the century, yet in just eight
years of inaction, that figure climbed to six percent a year.28
The scientists project that, if emissions reduction is delayed
until 2020, society would need to reduce emissions by fifteen
percent a year.29 At some point, the necessary cuts become too
drastic for global society to accomplish. As the Hansen team
emphasized: “[I]t is urgent that large, long-term emissions
reductions begin soon.”30
Moreover, it is important to understand that reducing
emissions alone is not adequate to restore climate equilibrium.
Because approximately forty percent of emissions persist in the
atmosphere for over a thousand years at present removal
rates, any planetary atmospheric rescue effort must also focus
on removing much of the carbon dioxide that has already

25. Id. at 9. But see PAUL BAER ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 (noting reductions of 6%
per year only have a 50% chance of holding the global warming under 2ºC, while more
aggressive reductions, 9% per year, increase the chance of staying under 2ºC to 66%).
The BEAR ET. AL. assessment does not account for the drawdown of CO2 contemplated
in the Climate Prescription. See, Climate Prescription, infra note 32, and
accompanying text.
26. See Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 10.
27. See PAUL BAER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1 (“The 1.5°C marker pathway is defined
as the most challenging mitigation pathway that can still be defended as being technoeconomically achievable.”).
28. Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 18.
29. Id. at 10 (“These results emphasize the urgency of initiating emissions reduction.
As discussed above, keeping global climate close to the Holocene range requires a longterm atmospheric CO2 level of about 350 ppm or less, with other climate forcing similar
to today’s levels. If emissions reduction had begun in 2005, reduction at 3.5%/year
would have achieved 350 ppm at 2100. Now the requirement is at least 6%/year. Delay
of emissions reductions until 2020 requires a reduction rate of 15%/year to achieve 350
ppm in 2100.”).
30. Id.
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accumulated in the atmosphere.31 Accordingly, the second part
of the scientific climate prescription addresses the “drawdown”
of carbon dioxide through massive reforestation (because trees
naturally absorb carbon dioxide) and improved agricultural
measures (because soil also absorbs carbon dioxide). The
Hansen team calculated that a full-scale massive restoration
program consisting of reforestation and soil measures can draw
down about 100 gigatons of carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere, an amount key to restoring atmospheric carbon
levels to 350 ppm.32
The global challenge of CO2 emissions reduction finds
unprecedented urgency due to nature’s own “tipping points”—
thresholds beyond which dangerous feedback processes are
triggered. Such feedbacks can unleash uncontrollable,
irreversible, “runaway” heating capable of destroying the
balance of the planet’s climate system.33 Such tipping points
form the crux of the scientific community’s call for urgent
action. Recognizing this danger, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in one climate case: “Several studies also show
that climate change may be non-linear, meaning that there are
positive feedback mechanisms that may push global warming
past a dangerous threshold (the ‘tipping point’).”34 Once fully
31. See William Moomaw, From Failure to Success: Reframing the Climate Treaty,
THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.fletcherforum.
org/2014/02/10/moomaw/. Only by restoring the Earth’s natural ability to remove
carbon can overall atmospheric levels drop. As Professor William Moomaw explained,
“We must not only turn off the faucet that is filling the atmosphere with heat trapping
gases, but we must also unclog the drain that is removing them.” Id.
32. Climate Prescription, supra note 4, at 10 (“[I]t is not impossible to return CO2 to
350 ppm this century. Reforestation and increase of soil carbon can help draw down
atmospheric CO2.”). If the drawdown from reforestation is less, the amount of carbon
emissions reduction necessary to achieve 350 ppm increases substantially. Id. While
the team admits that the forest and soil storage of 100 GT is ambitious, they point out
that the strategy includes beneficial externalities, including increased resilience to
climate change, improved productivity in agriculture, and further protection of
ecosystem function. Id.
33. See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS FEAR
TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE xxiv–vi (2007) (describing “unstoppable planetary
forces” beyond tipping points and the end of climatic stability); Leslie McCarthy,
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Research Finds that Earth’s Climate is
Approaching ‘Dangerous’ Point, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/
topstory/2007/danger_point.html (May 30, 2007) (discussing thresholds of global
temperatures and atmospheric carbon dioxide that trigger dangerous interference with
the climate system).
34. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d
508, 523 (9th Cir. 2007).
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triggered, these feedback loops continue despite any
subsequent carbon reductions achieved by humanity.35
Though the precise threshold of atmospheric CO2 that
represents the point-of-no-return is unknown,36 the global
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has surpassed 400
ppm.37 Already, some dangerous feedback loops are manifestly
in motion. Vast areas of melting permafrost now release huge
amounts of CO2 and methane (both of which are greenhouse
gasses) into the atmosphere,38 and melting polar ice caps
intensify the heating, because less ice remains to reflect heat
away from Earth—a dynamic known as the albedo effect.39 Gus
Speth, the former Dean of the Yale School of Forestry, warns
that if we maintain our largely inadequate course of action, the
world “won’t be fit to live in” by mid-century.40
B.

Atmospheric Trust Litigation: The Planet on the Docket

With such feedback loops looming, a rapid and decisive
response to the planet’s atmospheric crisis is paramount to
overcoming an existential threat to global civilization. As an
indicator of the growing international recognition of climate
danger, the recent COP21 talks in Paris produced an accord
aiming to limit planetary heating to 1.5ºC.41 Despite this

35. Scientists warn that continued carbon pollution will trigger feedback loops that
would lead to irreversible, uncontrollable global warming. See Nafeez Ahmed, James
Hansen: Fossil Fuel Addiction Could Trigger Runaway Global Warming, THE
GUARDIAN: EARTH INSIGHT (July 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
earth-insight/2013/jul/10/james-hansen-fossil-fuels-runaway-global-warming.
36. Id. See also Bill McKibben, The Tipping Point, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 3, 2008),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_tipping_point/2012/ (discussing the changing scientific
consensus about the tipping point as it has been adjusted from 550 parts per million to
350 parts per million since the mid-1990s).
37. See Adam Vaughn, Global Carbon Dioxide Levels Break 400ppm Milestone, THE
GUARDIAN (May 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/06/
global-carbon-dioxide-levels-break-400ppm-milestone.
38. See Nafeez Ahmed, Seven Facts You Need to Know About the Arctic Methane
Timebomb, THE GUARDIAN: EARTH INSIGHT (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/05/7-facts-need-to-know-arctic-methane-timebomb.
39. See James Hansen et al., Climate Change and Trace Gases, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1925, 1935 (2007) (“A climate forcing that ‘flips’ the
albedo of a sufficient portion of an ice sheet can spark a cataclysm.”).
40. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM,
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY x (2008).
41. For more details about the agreement, see UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
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aspirational goal, the actual plans submitted by the
participating countries would result in only half of the required
greenhouse gas reductions necessary to limit the increase to
just two degrees Celsius.42 Thus, while the remedy for the
climate change crisis increasingly becomes more difficult and
more expensive, not only in terms of monetary cost but in
societal and cultural upheaval as well, the Paris accord
continued the pattern of inadequate international action.43
Indeed, the failure of the Paris talks demonstrates that
domestic processes must provide the imperative for carbon
reduction. As Johannes Urpelainen of Columbia University
summarized, “[i]n the end, the future of climate mitigation
remains in the hands of national governments, political
parties, interest groups, [and] sub-national jurisdictions.”44
On the domestic level, the judiciary represents the third
branch of government, and a latecomer to the crisis that has
worsened in the hands of the legislative and executive
branches. Only recently have citizens asserted through
lawsuits their fundamental rights as a basis for climate action.
Most notably, the global campaign known as Atmospheric
Trust Litigation (ATL) was launched in 2011 to provide a legal
structure geared toward forcing urgent emissions reduction
around the world.45 ATL’s approach recognizes that, while

CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/more-details-about-the-agreement/
(last visited May 31, 2016).
42. See id. See also Bill McKibben, World Leaders Adopt 1.5 C Goal – and We’re
Damn Well Going to Hold Them to It, GRIST (Dec. 12, 2015), http://grist.org/climateenergy/world-leaders-adopt-1-5-c-goal-and-were-damn-well-going-to-hold-them-to-it/;
Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-changeaccord-paris.html.
43. See Davenport, supra note 42.
44. See Johannes Urpelainen, What Political Science Can Tell Us About the Paris
Climate Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/14/heres-what-political-science-can-tell-us-about-the-parisclimate-deal/. Michael Levi, an expert on energy and climate change policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations, summarized the agreement: “Whether or not this
becomes a true turning point for the world, though, depends critically on how seriously
countries follow through.” Davenport, supra note 42 (quoting Levi).
45. See Gabriel Nelson, Young Activists Sue U.S., States Over Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/
05greenwire-young-activists-sue-us-states-over-greenhouse-64366.html;
Matthew
Brown, Climate Activists Target States With Lawsuits; Atmosphere As a ‘Public
Trust’, CNSNEWS.COM (May 4, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/climateactivists-target-states-lawsuits-atmosphere-public-trust. The ATL approach was
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there is no panacea to a climate negotiation stalemate,
domestic courts have the power to order the political branches
to take swift and decisive action responsive to the climate
crisis.
In the first week of May 2011, young people organized by the
non-profit Our Children’s Trust initiated legal processes in
every state in the U.S. and began plans for suits in other
countries as well.46 The original legal “hatch” consisted of
lawsuits and administrative petitions filed against all fifty
states and the federal government.47 The campaign
represented an unprecedented effort at forcing a coherent
approach to a global problem using the judicial system.
All of the legal processes invoked the public trust doctrine
and declared a uniform sovereign trust duty to protect the
atmosphere needed by the youth and future generations for
their long-term survival. The petitions and lawsuits all
demanded enforceable Climate Recovery Plans from
government trustees to reduce carbon emissions at the rate
called for by the scientific prescription formulated by the
Hansen team of scientists (or best available science).48 These
plans would be backed up by annual carbon accountings to
show compliance with the prescription. More than a dozen
renowned scientists and experts submitted declarations in

described in Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C. G.
Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). See also Mary Christina
Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST (Ken Coghill et al. eds. 2012), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/
uploads/entries/ATL-Across-the-World.pdf.
46. For a comprehensive set of ATL updates and materials, consult the website of
Our Children’s Trust at http://ourchildrenstrust.org.
47. See Youth Sue the Government to Preserve the Future and Halt Climate Change,
OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/iMatter_Legal_
Release_11.05.01.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
48. The initial prescription was developed by the team for the litigation and
disseminated in May, 2011. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 221 (2013) (explaining the Hansen
team climate prescription that calls for an annual 6% reduction in carbon emissions
and the extraction of 100 gigatons of CO2 from the atmosphere through reforestation
and improved agricultural practices). The 6% figure was tied to a start year of 2013.
Because such reduction did not occur, the figure has increased steadily. See supra note
29 and accompanying text. The necessary annual global CO2 reduction as of 2016 is,
according to Dr. Hansen, 8%. See Inslee Administration Defies Court Order, Betrays
Children, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, June 1, 2016, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/
default/files/2016.06.01CleanAirRulePR.pdf.
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support of the litigation, and a nationwide group of law
professors submitted amicus briefs supporting the youth
plaintiffs in key ATL cases.
Unlike prior climate litigation brought under statutory law
or nuisance law suits geared towards isolated parts of the
climate problem, ATL presented for the first time a macro
approach to climate crisis by focusing on the atmosphere as a
single public trust asset in its entirety. The approach
characterizes all nations on Earth as sovereign co-trustees of
the atmosphere, bound together in a property-based
framework of corollary and mutual responsibilities. As
trustees, all nations owe a primary fiduciary obligation toward
their citizen beneficiaries to restore the atmospheric energy
balance and climate system.
ATL seeks to accomplish through decentralized domestic
litigation, in countries across the globe, what has thus far
eluded the international diplomatic treaty-making process:
concrete requirements for emissions reduction. Rising out of
this failure of international law, ATL’s unconventional effort
recognizes the need for a legal lever to force agencies and
legislatures to respond to the climate emergency.49 ATL
litigation teams hope that orchestrated lawsuits worldwide will
yield atmospheric trust decrees that will spur the political
branches to protect common atmospheric property before
tipping points send the world into unmitigated disaster.50 As
one commentator put it, “[w]ith both the executive and
legislative branches having been stymied on any major
climate-change progress for more than two decades, the
[litigation] represents a kind of Hail Mary pass, trusting that

49. See Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World, supra note 45.
50. The approach has been criticized by some scholars who maintain that the
political branches should solve the climate problem. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus,
Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can Two
Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 1139 (2015). The same scholars, however,
note that Congress has been abdicating its role in making environmental legislation.
See, e.g., id. at 1149. Congress is unlikely to act, given that 182 members do not believe
that climate disruption is even real. See Katie Herzog, Surprise! A Third of Congress
Members Are Climate Change Deniers, GRIST.ORG (Mar. 8, 2016), http://grist.org/
climate-energy/surprise-a-third-of-congress-members-are-climate-change-deniers/.
Moreover, the criticism seemingly arises from a misunderstanding of the requested
remedy. The role of the court is not to perform the job of the other branches, but rather
to force the other branches to perform their trust functions. Courts are not asked to
develop Climate Recovery Plans themselves.
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courts might bring about a speedier solution.”51
As expected in the initial stages, environmental agencies
denied the petitions for rulemaking in nearly every state.
Appeals were filed in only a few select state courts. Of those
appeals, only two states have explicitly declined to extend the
public trust doctrine to the atmosphere, though courts have
dismissed several cases on procedural grounds.52 Recently, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered the State
Department of Environmental Protection to “promulgate
regulations that address multiple sources or categories of
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on
emissions,” and “set limits that decline on an annual basis.”53
Meanwhile, cases in Colorado, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and Oregon are ongoing, and several more key cases will soon
be filed. On the international stage, Our Children’s Trust has
partnered with attorneys to file cases in Uganda, Ukraine, and
Pakistan, and the organization is working with attorneys on
citizen actions in the Netherlands, India, Canada, France,
England, Norway, and Belgium.54
In September, 2015, twenty-one youths from across the
nation launched a new federal lawsuit against multiple
agencies in the Obama administration with control over the
United States’ fossil fuel policies. The plaintiffs’ complaint in
Juliana v. U.S. asserts that the federal government continues
51. See Katherine Ellison, An Inconvenient Lawsuit: Teenagers Take Global
Warming to the Courts, THE ATLANTIC (May 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/05/an-inconvenient-lawsuit-teenagers-take-global-warming-tothe-courts/256903/.
52. For example, the trial court in Kansas dismissed the case for “failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.” See Kansas, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://our
childrenstrust.org/state/kansas (last visited April 24, 2016); see also Filippone ex rel.
Filippone v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)
(declining to apply the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because previously the
Iowa Supreme Court had declined to extend the doctrine to forested areas and public
alleyways). However, Judge Doyle’s concurring opinion cites statutes expressing the
“policy of the State of Iowa to protect its natural resource heritage of air, soils, waters,
and wildlife for the benefit of present and future citizens.” Id. See also Aronow v. State,
No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (declining to extend the
public trust doctrine to the atmosphere because no court in Minnesota or any other
jurisdiction had done so, and because it had refused to apply the doctrine to land in a
previous holding).
53. See Kain v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. SJC-11961, at 9 (Mass. May 17, 2016),
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.05.17.MASupCtDecision.pdf
54. See International Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.
org/legal/international (last visited May 12, 2016).
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to violate the youngest generation’s constitutional rights and
fails to protect essential natural resources in the public trust
by promoting the development of fossil fuels.55 It states:
For over fifty years, the United States of America has
known that carbon dioxide (“CO2”) pollution from
burning fossil fuels was causing global warming and
dangerous climate change, and that continuing to burn
fossil fuels would destabilize the climate system on
which present and future generations of our nation
depend for their wellbeing and survival. . . . Despite this
knowledge, Defendants continued their policies and
practices of allowing the exploitation of fossil fuels.56
The youth plaintiffs gained a strong initial victory in the
litigation on April 8, 2016 when Magistrate Judge Thomas
Coffin recommended denial of the government’s and fossil fuel
interveners’ motions to dismiss in all aspects, finding that both
the constitutional claims and the federal public trust claim
could go forward.57 The court stated: “Given the allegations of
direct or threatened direct harm, albeit shared by most of the
population or future population, the court should be loath to
decline standing to persons suffering an alleged concrete injury
of a constitutional magnitude.”58 At the time of this writing,
Judge Coffin’s findings were pending review before federal
district court Judge Ann Aiken. If the case moves forward to
trial, the federal government’s fossil fuel policies and their
climate impacts will be subject to broad open scrutiny for the
first time, prompting the youths’ attorneys to call this the
55. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Juliana v. United
States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Juliana Complaint],
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/YouthAmendedComplaintAgainstUS.pdf.
An earlier case, Alec L. v. Jackson, was dismissed by the District of Columbia. Alec L.
v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. D.C. 2012), aff’g Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy,
561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (finding Clean Air
Act displaced the public trust claim).
56. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at 1.
57. See Order and Findings & Recommendation, Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv-1517TC (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Juliana Order], http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/
default/files/16.04.08.OrderDenyingMTD.pdf.
58. Id. at 7. For coverage of the case, see James Conca, Federal Court Rules on
Climate Change In Favor of Today’s Children, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/04/10/federal-court-rules-on-climate-change-in-favorof-todays-children/#273936b06219. See also John Schwartz, In Novel Tactic on Climate
Change, Citizens Sue Their Governments, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/05/11/science/climate-change-citizen-lawsuits.html?_r=0.
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“trial of the millennium.”59
In sum, ATL is a full-scale, coordinated campaign with
multiple suits pending and others teed up in different forums,
all connected by a common template of science and law.
Unprecedented in scope, this campaign calls upon the judicial
branch to force an eleventh-hour response to the intensifying
civilizational threat in the narrow window of time remaining.
In any successful legal campaign, there are path-breaking
cases that dismantle barriers and pioneer the development of
new law. Just as Brown v. Board of Education60 marked the
emergence of a new legal mechanism to confront racial
inequality, and as Obergefell v. Hodges61 enumerated that
same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, one recent ATL
case in Washington State, Foster v. Washington Department of
Ecology,62 similarly provides principles that forge important
ground in the climate trust campaign. The next section
provides background for discussing Foster by explaining the
public trust doctrine more fully, which provides the foundation
for the ATL approach.
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST FRAMEWORK

The public trust doctrine requires government to hold vital
natural resources in trust for the public beneficiaries, both
present and future generations.63 The doctrine presents
59. See Coco McPherson, Why Young Americans Are Suing Obama Over Climate
Change, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
why-young-americans-are-suing-obama-over-climate-change-20160312.
60. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
61. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
62. The litigation has produced three orders, referred to in this Article as Foster I,
Foster II, and Foster III. See Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology (Foster I), No. 14-2-252951 SEA, at 1–2 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015); Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology
(Foster II), No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). For the court’s
recent disposition as this article goes to press, see Order on Petitioners’ Motion for
Relief Under CR 60(b), Foster III, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (May 16, 2016). See also Peter
Andrew Hart, Washington State Kids Score Huge Legal Win in Climate Change
Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
washingtonk-kids-climate-lawsuit_us_5723f60ae4b01a5ebde5be52.
63. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)
(“The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of
government and the preservation of the peace.”); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
525–29 (1896) (detailing ancient and English common law principles of sovereign trust
ownership of air, water, sea, shores, and wildlife and stating: “[T]he power or control
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reserved, inalienable property rights held by the public to
protect crucial resources from monopolization and/or
destruction by private interests. The doctrine gives force to the
plain expectation, central to the purpose of organized
government: that natural resources essential for survival and
welfare remain abundant, justly distributed, and bequeathed
to future generations. In a very basic sense, the public trust
principle governs for the endurance of the nation and its fifty
states.
The public trust stands apart from police power as a source
of authority and duty incumbent on the government.64 As a
property-based counterweight to government’s discretionary
police power, the trust secures the people’s rights to a
sustained natural endowment. This principle has been
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court many times and manifests
in a multitude of court decisions, constitutions, and statutes
from across this country and, indeed, from around the world.65
American courts routinely recognize the ancient origins of the
public trust as tracing back to the beginnings of human
civilization and legal systems. The essential public rights that
infuse the trust were expressed in Roman times in the
Institutes of Justinian, which declared: “By the law of nature
these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”66
The trust is rooted in the original social compact citizens
make with their governments. Because citizens would never
confer to their government the power to substantially impair
resources crucial to their survival and welfare,67 the governing
lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all
other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people.”); Ariz. Ctr. for
Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“The
beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come”).
See also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 557–66 (1970) (seminal article discussing
public trust concept). For cases and materials on the public trust doctrine, see
MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2d ed. 2015).
64. See Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation:
Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L.
259, 272 (2015).
65. See generally BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 63 (compiling cases across the U.S.
and in nations world-wide).
66. J. INST., 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867).
67. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
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assumption of the public trust principle is that citizens reserve
public ownership of crucial resources as a perpetual trust to
sustain society and the nation. In keeping with the traditional
trust framework, governments hold natural resources (the res)
in a trust for present and future generations of citizens (the
beneficiaries).68
As the United States Supreme Court held in Geer v.
Connecticut, “the power or control lodged in the State,
resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like
all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people.”69 Such reserved public property rights to crucial
resources are fundamental to the democratic understandings
underlying all state and federal government authority in the
United States.70 Courts have often said that privatization of
essential resources “would be a grievance which never could be
long borne by a free people.”71 As Professor Joseph Sax
famously noted, the public trust demarcates a society of
“citizens rather than of serfs.”72
A seminal public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, demonstrates the limits imposed by the public trust on
government actors. There, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted
a legislative conveyance of Lake Michigan’s shoreline to a
private railroad company. The Court found that the state
legislature had no authority to make such a conveyance,
because the lands were held in public trust; accordingly, the
railroad’s title was invalid.73 A contrary rule, the Court noted,
would “place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a
majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is
situated.”74 The Court made clear the constitutional trust
68. See Hassell, 837 P.2d at 169 (“The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just
present generations but those to come.”).
69. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
70. See San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th
202, 232 (2015) (“The public trust doctrine, which is traceable to Roman law, rests on
several related concepts. First, that the public rights of commerce, navigation, fishery,
and recreation are so intrinsically important and vital to free citizens that their
unfettered availability to all is essential in a democratic democracy.”) (quoting Zack’s,
Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1175–76 (2008)).
71. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J. Law
1, 78 (1821)).
72. Sax, supra note 63, at 484.
73. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453–56.
74. Id. at 455.
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restraint upon legislatures:
The legislature could not give away nor sell the
discretion of its successors in respect to matters, the
government of which, from the very nature of things,
must vary with varying circumstances. The legislation,
which may be needed one day for the harbor, may be
different from the legislation that may be required at
another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its
existence, exercise the power of the State in the
execution of the trust devolved upon it.75
The public trust is characteristically explained as an
attribute of sovereignty that government cannot shed.76 As the
Court declared in Illinois Central, “[t]he state can no more
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested,” than “it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government.”77 One federal district court
noted: “The trust is of such a nature that it can be held only by
the sovereign, and can only be destroyed by the destruction of
the sovereign.”78
Modern scholars and judges increasingly recognize the
constitutional force of the public trust doctrine.79 Professor
Gerald Torres describes the trust as the slate upon which “all
constitutions and laws are written.”80 In the landmark opinion

75. Id. at 460.
76. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896) (describing the sovereign
trust over wildlife resources as an “attribute of government”); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (“history and precedent have established the
public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign authority.”). See also Karl S. Coplan,
Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle
Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 311 (2010) (“The idea that public trust limits
and powers inhere in the very nature of sovereignty is one consistent thread in public
trust cases. . . . Public trust principles have been described as an essential attribute of
sovereignty across cultures and across millennia.”).
77. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
78. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
79. See Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 879–80 (2001) (explaining
constitutional reserved powers doctrine as reflection of the public trust principle). For
further discussion, see Gerald Torres & Nate Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s
DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2014).
80. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 126 (quoting Torres & Bellinger,
supra note 79). See also Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993)
(Phil.), as reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44
(Thompson West 2006) (The “right to a balanced and healthful ecology . . . may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions. . . . [T]hese basic rights need not

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/14

18

Wood and Woodward: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a He

2016]

ATL: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AT LAST

651

Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, a plurality of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the trust as embodying
the “inherent and indefeasible” rights of citizens reserved
though their social contract with government.81 While the
Pennsylvania Constitution contains a specific amendment
setting forth the public trust,82 the Robinson opinion makes
clear that the enactment of Article 1, Section 27 did not create
new rights, but rather enumerated the pre-existing rights that
the people had reserved for themselves in creating the
government.83 Similarly, courts in Wisconsin, Louisiana,
Alaska, Arizona, and Hawaii have also recognized the
constitutional underpinnings of the public trust doctrine, often
interpreting the principle in conjunction with specific
constitutional provisions.84
Most recently, the ATL case, Juliana v. U.S., found a federal
constitutional public trust duty embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: “The doctrine is
deeply rooted in our nation’s history and indeed predates it.”85
The federal government defendants and industry interveners
took the position that there is no constitutional public trust bar
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
mankind.”).
81. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
The court described such rights as “of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to
be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’” Id. at 947.
82. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (added by amendment in 1971).
83. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948 (“Among the inherent rights of the people of
Pennsylvania are those enumerated in Section 27.”); id. at 1016 n.36 (“’[T]he concept
that certain rights are inherent to mankind, and thus are secured rather than
bestowed by the Constitution, has a long pedigree in Pennsylvania that goes back at
least to the founding of the Republic.’”) (quoting Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208
(Pa. 2013)); see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“Natural rights inherent in people. We
declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right: that all power
is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness.”).
84. State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Wis. 1983) (grounding the public trust
doctrine in the state constitution); Save Ourselves v. State Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452
So.2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (recognizing a public trust based on the state constitution);
Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493–96 (Alaska 1988)
(holding that the constitutional “common use” clause adopted common law trust
principles in relation to fish, wildlife, and water resources); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the
Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting public trust
and the gift clause of the state constitution); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.
3d 409, 443–44 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the public trust doctrine was “a fundamental
principle of constitutional law in Hawaii”).
85. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 20.
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preventing Congress from alienating the territorial waters of
the U.S. to private corporations. The magistrate judge said:
“Nor can I imagine that our coastal sea waters could possibly
be privatized without implicating principles that reflect core
values of our Constitution and the very essence of the purpose
of our nation’s government.”86
Abroad, the public trust finds expression in many nations’
constitutions.87 The Philippines Supreme Court described the
public trust’s primordial constitutional force in Oposa v.
Factoran when it halted logging of the country’s last remaining
ancient forest. The Oposa court declared:
[E]very generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. . . .
[This] belongs to a different category of rights [than
civil and political rights] altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation . . . the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions.
....
[T]hese basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned[,] . . . it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers that unless [these rights] are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself . . . the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.88
Natural commonwealth sustains a nation. The public trust
principle aims to protect resources that are vital for
sovereignty, survival, and human welfare, so as promote the
endurance of society as it unfolds into future generations.
Thus, the trust imposes strict fiduciary obligations on trustees
to protect the assets that they hold in trust for the people.89 A
86. Id. at 23.
87. See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 63, at 305–332.
88. See also Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.), as
reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 (Thompson West
2006) (emphasis added).
89. For a discussion of fiduciary duties, see Section III.B.2, infra, and accompanying
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key question in public trust jurisprudence concerns the scope
of the protected assets, or the res. ATL asserts that air is part
of the class of resources protected in trust.
As a starting point, the trust res consists of natural assets
recognized to serve the trust’s purpose. When defining the
scope of the trust res, courts have always looked to the needs of
the public. This analytical framework originates with Illinois
Central’s seminal characterization of public trust assets as “a
subject of public concern to the whole people of the state.”90
Noting that the trust arises “necessarily from the public
character of the property,” the Court held that such trust
assets “cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and
control of the state.”91 As Professor Charles Wilkinson
explains, “[t]he public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept
that some resources are so central to the well-being of the
community that they must be protected by distinctive, judgemade principles.”92 Guided by such principles, courts have
greatly expanded the scope of public trust property over time.
The original cases dealt primarily with navigable waters,
fisheries, and wildlife, because those resources played a vital
role in the dominant nineteenth-century pursuits of fishing,
navigation, and commerce. But the “public concern” test
announced in Illinois Central naturally led courts to expand
the res to keep pace with scientific knowledge and modern
concerns. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed: “[W]e
perceive the public trust doctrine not to be ‘fixed or static,’ but
one to ‘be molded and extended to meet changing conditions
and needs of the public it was created to benefit.’”93 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii similarly stated that “the ‘purposes’
or ‘uses’ of the public trust have evolved with changing public
values and needs.”94 Various courts now recognize modern
text.
90. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (emphasis added). See also WOOD,
NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 146–61 (for a broader discussion of the evolution of
the “public concern” precedent).
91. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454–56.
92. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 315 (1980).
93. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
94. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000). See also
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“In administering the trust the state
is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over
another.”).
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concerns such as biodiversity, wildlife habitat, aesthetics, and
recreation as purposes of the trust.95 Correspondingly, courts
have applied the trust doctrine well beyond its traditional
scope to assets such as groundwater, wetlands, dry sand
beaches, parks, non-navigable waterways, and most recently,
air and atmosphere.96
As courts advance their understanding of ecology, some are
inclined to expand the trust res to reflect the reality of
inextricably connected resources. The Supreme Court of
Hawaii, for example, held that groundwater must be
considered part of the trust res because of its inseparability
from surface water: “Modern science and technology have
discredited the surface-ground dichotomy. . . . We confirm that
the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources,
unlimited by surface ground distinction.”97 In a similar vein,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson opinion
emphasized the public’s interest in habitable communities and
recognized a full gamut of natural resources in the trust res,
including “resources that implicate the public interest, such as
ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora and fauna
(including fish) that are outside the scope of purely private
property.”98

95. See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (wildlife habitat and recreation); Mineral Cnty.
v. State Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 20 P.3d 800, 808 (Nev. 2001) (aesthetics);
Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (climate
stability); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th
202, 233 (2015) (“[A]n increasingly important public use is the preservation of trust
lands ‘in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.’”).
96. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (groundwater); Matthews,
471 A.2d at 358 (dry sand area); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2015) (appeal pending) (dry sand beach); Big Sur Properties v. Mott, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 835, 837 (Ct. App. 1976) (park); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine
Cnty., 658 P.2 709, 719–22 (Cal. 1983) (non-navigable tributaries); Just v. Marinette
Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768–69 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City
of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (wetlands); Owsichek v. State Guide
Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495–96 (Alaska 1988) (fish, wildlife, and
water).
97. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447. See also id. at 457 (the trust
demands “the maintenance of ecological balance.”).
98. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
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III. THE THREE STAGES OF ATMOSPHERIC TRUST
LITIGATION
Against this backdrop, Atmospheric Trust Litigation seeks
to apply the fundamental public trust duty of protection to the
atmosphere to abate continued damage from GHG pollution
and restore climate balance. Not unlike other coordinated
litigation campaigns, ATL must progress through three stages
to prove effective. First, the courts must recognize the
paramount judicial role in upholding the rights of the
plaintiffs. Second, the courts must issue declarations of
principle that will guide government actors and provide a
framework for the remedy. Third, the courts must manage the
remedy so that it offers a practical means to enforce the rights
of the plaintiffs. Unlike other campaigns, however, the urgency
attending ATL is unprecedented given the climate tipping
points described at the outset of this Article. The courts must
move swiftly through these stages, and ultimately in
coordinated fashion, to force the political branches of
government to carry out the GHG reduction necessary to
salvage a habitable planet before those irrevocable thresholds
are passed. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous admonition
applies with haunting implications to such climate cases:
“There is such a thing as being too late.”99 The Foster v.
Department of Ecology case, as discussed in Section III, proves
groundbreaking for all three stages of atmospheric trust
litigation. The discussion below elaborates on these three
stages and surveys the ATL landscape prior to the Foster
decision.
A.

Stage 1: Recognizing the Judicial Role

The cornerstone of any trust lies in judicial enforcement. If
fiduciary obligations become unenforceable in court, a trustee
can exert untrammeled power over the beneficiaries’ property
and use that power to advance his or her own singular
interests. Judge Learned Hand once stated that courts must
have the ability to enforce fiduciary obligations, or what
claimed to be a trust would amount to no more than a
99. Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam at Riverside Church (Apr. 4, 1967)
(transcript at http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_
beyond_vietnam/).
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“precatory admonition.”100 In the public trust realm, courts
have recognized that judicial enforcement stands essential to
the balance of power. In a leading public trust case, the Hawaii
Supreme Court stated, “The check and balance of judicial
review provides a level of protection against improvident
dissipation of an irreplaceable res.”101
The sheer urgency of climate crisis magnifies this important
judicial role. Recently, the Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin—a
sitting senior judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
former Chief Judge of that circuit—issued a “wake up call” for
judges, warning: “The current state of affairs . . . reveals a
wholesale failure of the legal system to protect humanity from
the collapse of finite natural resources by the uncontrolled
pursuit of short-term profits. . . . Whether grounded in Article
III or state constitutional provisions, the third branch must
now recognize its obligation to provide a check on government
exercise of power over the public trust.”102
A court often signals its willingness to engage a particular
issue by delivering preliminary rulings on procedural grounds
raised by the defendants, usually in a motion to dismiss. The
posture of any climate case is challenging, because a system of
statutory laws exists to address the problem of harmful
pollution, and various state and federal administrative actions
are proceeding within that system. It may be difficult for
judges to appreciate that they should have a role enforcing a
100. See Stix v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (noting, in the context of Indian trust
doctrine, that a “fundamental incident” of the trust relationship is “the right of an
injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the
trust”).
101. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455. See also Lake Mich.
Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“The very
purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature’s disposition of public
lands. If courts were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, as Loyola advocates, the
doctrine would have no teeth.”); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837
P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive
branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust.”). Public
trust enforcement provides a means of limiting the breathtaking power of government.
As James Madison noted: “In Framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51 (James Madison), avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.
102. Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785,
785–88 (2015).
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public trust obligation outside of this statutory context. They
may instead assume that the matter should be left entirely to
the other branches to address without supervision.103 Such
judges will usually dismiss the case on grounds of political
question doctrine, preemption, or displacement—doctrines that
broadcast confidence in the political branches.104 Indeed,
several ATL cases have met with this fate in the early stages of
litigation.105
Courts are called to their role in ATL cases by
understanding four aspects of the youths’ claim. First, the
public trust claim asserts constitutional rights. It remains
manifestly a court’s duty to enforce constitutional rights
against the other branches; such rights may not be preempted
or brushed aside on political question grounds—a realization
beginning to take hold in the context of ATL cases.106 The court
in Robinson paved the way for such awareness when it
declared the public trust to embody a fundamental, inherent,
inalienable right.107
Second, the claim involves an urgent and unprecedented
threat. The normal inclination to leave the matter to political
and administrative processes holds far less sway in times of
extreme urgency. In the past, courts have recognized urgency

103. Some scholars take this position as well, even in face of legislative paralysis.
See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 50.
104. For discussion, see LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 39–43, 46, 66
(N.Y.U. Press 2001).
105. See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D. D.C. 2012) (dismissing
ATL federal suit on basis of displacement by Clean Air Act and noting that agencies
are “better equipped” than courts to address carbon emissions); Chernaik v. Kitzhaber,
328 P.3d 799 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing lower court’s dismissal that had been
based on political question doctrine, separation of powers doctrine, sovereign
immunity, and the court’s perceived lack of authority to grant requested relief.);
Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014) (finding
public trust but refusing to grant relief on prudential grounds).
106. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 14 (denying government defendants’
political question defense, noting: “The complaint does raise issues of whether
government action/inaction violates the Constitution and these are issues committed to
the courts rather than either of the political branches.”); Chernaik, 328 P.3d at 804–08
(a judicial declaration on the scope of the public trust does not violate separation of
powers.); Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097–99 (finding three of plaintiff’s claims not barred by
political question doctrine, but finding that it was not prudent to address them at the
time).
107. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality
opinion).
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as justifying a swift judicial relief in the public trust context.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in declaring the
public trust rights to certain dry sand beaches in that state:
“[T]his State is rapidly approaching a crisis as to the
availability to the public of its priceless beach areas. The
situation will not be helped by restrained judicial
pronouncements. Prompt and decisive action by the Court is
needed.”108
It hardly needs stating that the beach recreation crisis,
which prompted decisive pronouncements by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, pales in comparison to the imminent climate
crisis already threatening irrevocable planetary tipping points.
As climate scientist James Hansen declared in an amicus brief
in one atmospheric trust case, judicial relief “may be the best,
the last, and, at this late stage, the only real chance to
preserve a habitable planet for young people and future
generations.”109
Third, the ATL claim alleges threatened harm of a
magnitude that is unprecedented.110 Declarations made by
leading scientists in ATL cases describe the dire situation

108. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978). See also Oposa v.
Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.), as reprinted in JAN G. LAITOS
ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44 (Thompson West 2006) (finding that logging
violated public trust and noting that “the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for generations to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.”).
109. Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 7.
110. Until the Foster case, discussed in Section IV, infra, courts handling
atmospheric trust cases have tended to eschew discussion of the potential harm
brought on by climate crisis. This judicial silence may reflect confusion over the
climate threat. For years, the fossil fuel industry has sowed doubt about the climate
crisis to protect itself from regulation. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY,
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON
ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (Bloomsbury Press 2011); CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 60–62 (Basic Books 2006) (describing the
emergence of reliable and readily available climate change science in the later 1980s,
and the fossil fuel industry’s concurrent attempts to cast doubt on that science). A
thorough investigation conducted by the LA Times and Inside Climate News revealed
that major fossil fuel corporations understood the harm from their actions decades ago,
even though they projected uncertainty about it to the public. See Bill McKibben,
Exxon Knew Everything There Was to Know About Climate Change by the Mid-1980s—
and Denied It, THE NATION (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/exxonknew-everything-there-was-to-know-about-climate-change-by-the-mid-1980s-anddenied-it/. As these revelations spread through the press, they may alert judges to the
climate exigency and the industry’s role in obfuscating it.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/14

26

Wood and Woodward: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a He

2016]

ATL: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AT LAST

659

faced by the youth plaintiffs and emphasize that the future
survival of humanity is at stake. In 2011, Dr. James Hansen,
while writing as head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space
Studies, expressed the situation in an amicus science brief
submitted in an ATL case brought against the U.S.
government:
[U]nabated fossil fuel emissions the Earth increasingly
out of energy balance. Unless action is undertaken
without further delay[,] . . . Earth’s cli- mate system
will be pressed toward and past points of no return. . . .
[D]elay in undertaking sharp reductions in emissions
will undermine any realistic chance of preserving a
habitable climate system.111
The extent, gravity, and continuing nature of climate harm
give atmospheric trust litigation monumental importance. As
judges become increasingly aware of the climate threat, they
are likely to take seriously their role in protecting youth
against climate disruption—particularly when scientists warn
the court directly through declarations and amicus briefs that
continued inaction would seal in future conditions likely
leading to massive death, destruction, and utter chaos across
the globe that youth alive today (plaintiffs before the court)
will face later in their life spans. Moreover, the atmospheric
trust litigation itself, by providing a venue for such climate
science through declarations, amicus briefs, and testimony,
holds tremendous value as a truth-seeking forum amidst a
crisis that has been overtly manipulated and distorted for the
public eye by the industry that stands to profit most by
misinformation.112
Finally, the ATL claim asserts that the other branches of
government, left alone, will not react to the crisis in time, and
with sufficient measures. This is a difficult matter for courts to
appreciate, because environmental statutory law carries the
implicit promise that agencies will sufficiently protect the
resources the public relies upon.113 In several early ATL cases,
courts presumed that administrative action was enough to

111. Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
112. For a discussion of industry misinformation affecting government’s response to
public health crises, see ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 110.
113. For further discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, at 1–18.
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protect the air and atmosphere.114 Yet as the climate clock
ticks down without action and the public grows more nervous
and aware of agency failures, judges too are likely to question
the adequacy of administrative measures, particularly when
the youth plaintiffs point out the longstanding failure in
concrete terms with reference to climate science.
In the federal ATL case now pending in the federal district
court of Oregon, plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that, in
the late 1980s, members of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee wrote a letter expressly requesting the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to prepare a plan to stabilize
the global climate system and transition the nation away from
fossil fuels.115 The Committee recognized: “There is a very real
possibility that man—through ignorance or indifference or
both—is irreversibly altering the ability of our atmosphere to
perform basic life support functions.”116 Plaintiffs allege that
EPA did develop such a plan, but it was never implemented,
and the government continued to pursue a fossil fuel regime
fraught with danger.117 Based on this and other evidence of
delay, the plaintiffs charge that government defendants “have
acted with deliberate indifference to the peril they knowingly
created.”118 In his opinion recommending that the youth’s
claims go forward, Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin
underscored the aspects above when he wrote:
The debate about climate change and its impact has
been before various political bodies for some time now.
Plaintiffs give this debate justiciability by asserting
harms that befall or will befall them personally and to a
greater extent than older segments of society. It may be

114. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1227
(N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the Air Quality Control Act passed by the New
Mexico legislature “established adequate procedures to address and implement any
regulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere”).
115. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at paras. 138–39.
116. Letter from U.S. S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works to Lee Thomas,
Administrator, EPA (Sept. 12, 1986), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/
SG_Wood_095_KKG_Senators_Letter__EPA.pdf.
117. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at paras. 140, 146 (“In response, in
December, EPA submitted a report to Congress on ‘Policy Options for Stabilizing
Global Climate.’ The EPA’s 1990 report concluded: ‘responses to the greenhouse
problem that are undertaken now will be felt for decades in the future, and lack of
action now will similarly bequeath climate change to future generations.’”).
118. Id. at para. 8.
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that eventually the alleged harms, assuming the
correctness of plaintiffs’ analysis of the impacts of
global climate change, will befall all of us. But the
intractability of the debates before Congress and state
legislatures and the alleged valuing of short-term
economic interest despite the cost to human life
necessitates a need for the courts to evaluate the
constitutional parameters of the action or inaction
taken by the government.119
Unlike much litigation, ATL cases are caught in a whirlwind
of fast-breaking news regarding climate destabilization. As
reports stream in from around the world regarding the dangers
posed by continued GHG emissions, and the continuing failure
of agencies and legislatures to act, courts that recognize their
role in protecting the rights of youth will press the case
forward to a second stage.
B.

Stage 2: Issuing Declarations of Principle

The second stage of ATL involves declaring government
climate obligations. These derive from basic principles of public
trust law that establish fiduciary obligations owed by a trustee
toward the beneficiaries. Such declarations form the sidewalls
of obligation that courts use in devising a remedy at the third
stage of litigation. The necessary declarations in ATL cases, as
explained further below, concern the character of air or
atmosphere as a trust asset and the duty of government
trustees to protect and restore it.120
Notably, judicial declarations in the climate context will
likely reverberate far beyond the four walls of the courtroom.
In light of the magnitude of the planetary threat, a clear
judicial ruling in an ATL case from one country is likely to
receive attention by citizens, officials, and courts of other
countries. When strong rulings in climate cases were rendered
in Pakistan and the Netherlands in 2015, the rulings attracted
swift international news attention.121 The public trust holds

119. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 8.
120. For purposes of this article, the terms “air” and “atmosphere” are used
interchangeably.
121. In the Netherlands, a court found that the Dutch government’s climate action
was wholly inadequate to meet the scale of the threat, and it ordered the government
to slash emissions 25% within 5 years. Arthur Neslen, Dutch Government Ordered to
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unique capacity for extraterritorial influence because the
principle, deriving from ancient Roman law, has iterations in
nations throughout the world.122
1.

The Atmosphere as a Public Trust Asset

In order to hold governments accountable to protect the
atmosphere and climate system under the public trust, courts
must first declare the atmosphere a public trust asset. The
history, principles, and intent of the public trust doctrine
compel recognition of the atmosphere as one of the crucial
assets in the public trust. As previously discussed, the seminal
test from Illinois Central asks whether the resource is “a
subject of public concern to the whole people of the state.”123
That the atmosphere qualifies as a resource of “public concern”
seems indisputable, as it supports the climate system upon
which all humans rely for survival and well-being. While in the
late 1800s, at the time of Illinois Central, the natural resources
subject to greatest monopoly were water-based resources that
supported
fishing,
navigation,
and
commerce,
no
environmental issue today holds greater concern for youth
than climate disruption induced by unregulated GHG
emissions into the atmosphere.
The public property interest in air traces back to Roman
times, when the Institutes of Justinian recognized that, “‘[b]y
the law of nature,’ ‘the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea,’ [are] ‘common to
mankind.’”124 This statement of Roman law continues to be
Cut Carbon Emissions in Landmark Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015), http://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cutcarbon-emissions-landmark-ruling. In Pakistan, the court ordered government to take
climate action according to timeframes set by the court and said that “the delay and
lethargy of the State . . . offend[ed] the fundamental rights of the citizens.” Ashgar
Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) Lahore High Ct. (Pak.), edigest.elaw.org/sites/
default/files/pk.leghari.091415.pdf (this opinion remains unreported at the time of this
publication).
122. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the
Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 763 (2012); see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra
note 63, ch. 10.
123. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892). The Court also described public
trust assets as “public property, or property of a special character” which “cannot be
placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the state.” Id. at 454.
124. See Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1986) (quoting
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 2.1.1 (533) (T. Sandars trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876))
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cited as the foundation of the public trust doctrine in modern
cases.125 In Geer v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court relied
on ancient Roman law’s classification of “res communes” to find
the public trust doctrine applicable to wildlife.126 Air forms an
indisputable part of res communes. The U.S. Supreme Court in
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. declared a public property
interest in air when it said that “the state has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain.”127
Against this context, courts in several atmospheric trust
cases have already either expressly or presumably recognized
air or atmosphere as a public trust asset.128 In Texas, the
district court found that all natural resources were protected
under the public trust doctrine and the state’s constitution.129
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated: “[W]e assume without
deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust
subject to the doctrine.”130 The Alaska Supreme Court held
that the youth “make a good case” that “the atmosphere is an
asset of the public trust, with the State as trustee and the
public as beneficiaries.”131 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
(noting Roman law as the “genesis” of the public trust doctrine).
125. See id.; see also United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D.
Mass. 1981); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th
202, 232 (2015).
126. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523–25 (1896).
127. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (emphasis added)
(upholding action by State of Georgia against Tennessee copper companies for transboundary air pollution).
128. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1226–
27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Bosner-Lain v. State Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality, Cause No.
D-1-GN-11-002194 (Texas Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012) (overturned on procedural grounds);
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209, *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013)
(dismissal affirmed for lack of remedy). See also Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of
Nat. Res., 355 P.3d 1088, 1101–02 (Alaska 2014) (upheld dismissal on prudential
grounds); but see Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 (Or. Cir. Ct.
May 11, 2015) (holding that the State has no trust responsibility to preserve the
atmosphere for future generations) (appeal pending).
129. See Bosner-Lain, Cause No. D-1-GN-11-002194, at 1. The Texas Court of
Appeals subsequently held that the legislature had not extended to state courts the
right to hear cases involving the denial of rulemaking petitions by the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality. See Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality v. Bosner-Lain,
No. 03-12-0555-CV, 9–12 (Tex. App. Ct. July 23, 2014), http://cases.justia.com/texas/
third-court-of-appeals/2014-03-12-00555-cv.pdf?ts=1406110510.
130. Butler, 2013 WL 1091209 at *6 (but affirming the trial court’s dismissal).
131. See Kanuk, 355 P.3d at 1101–02 (but refusing to order the relief sought by the
plaintiffs on prudential grounds).
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stated, “[O]ur state constitution recognizes that a public trust
duty exists for the protection of New Mexico’s natural
resources, including the atmosphere, for the benefit of the
people of this state.”132 While two ATL decisions have found no
public trust responsibility towards air on the basis that cases
historically applied the public trust to navigable waters and
their streambeds,133 the appeals decisions in Texas, Alaska,
Arizona, and New Mexico reflect growing judicial acceptance of
the atmosphere as part of the public trust.
2.

The Fiduciary Obligations

Scores of courts have recognized that the sine qua non of the
public trust is the sovereign’s fiduciary duty to protect the
public’s crucial assets from irrevocable damage.134 Two active
duties provide the contours of an atmospheric trust case and
form the basis for a declaratory judgment against government
trustees: (1) the duty to protect the asset against “substantial
impairment,”135 and (2) the duty to restore the asset that has
been damaged.136 Courts in atmospheric trust cases should
132. Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225 (but affirming the district court’s granting of
summary judgment to the defendants because the State’s public trust responsibility
was met pursuant to the Air Quality and Control Act.).
133. See Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589
(Table) (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); but see id. (J. Doyle, concurring) (noting that public trust
over air seems “clear as a crisp, cloudless, autumn Iowa ski”); Chernaik ex rel.
Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015). The Oregon Chernaik
case is on appeal before the Oregon Court of Appeals. Law professors from across the
nation have submitted an amicus scholars brief contending that the case was wrongly
decided and that the public trust extends to air. See Michael C. Blumm, Mary C. Wood
& Steven M. Thiel, The Oregon Public Trust Doctrine and Atmospheric Greenhouse
Gas Pollution: A Law Professors’ Amicus Brief (Feb. 1, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720012.
134. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (“[I]t is the duty of the
legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure
its beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (describing the public trust as
“an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands”); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.
3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their
beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are
judicially accountable for the dispositions for the public trust.”).
135. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 451–53 (“substantial
impairment” standard); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242
Cal. App. 4th 202, 237, 239 (2015) (same).
136. For discussion of the public trust restoration duty see Wood & Galpern, supra
note 64, at 132–33. For discussion of the parallel duty in the private trust context, see
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make clear that these public trust duties stand separate and
apart from statutory and regulatory duties devised by
legislatures and agencies.137 This is an important dimension of
an ATL declaration because typically there is an existing
regulatory scheme that portends to force GHG reduction, but
such schemes are often merely aspirational, outdated, not
based on science, or not implemented.138 Courts should
emphasize that the public trust forms the yardstick against
which such statutes and regulations are to be measured. As
the Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Kootenai
Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., “[M]ere
compliance by [agencies] with their legislative authority is not
sufficient to determine if their actions comport with the
requirements of the public trust doctrine. The public trust
doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible
government action with respect to public resources.”139
Moreover, to be at all effective in forcing climate action, ATL
declarations should emphasize the active nature of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(a), (c) (1959). The restoration duty is also
expressed in environmental statutes. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531 et seq.; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Cleanup, Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.; Resource
Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.
137. See, e.g., Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004) (“The doctrine exists
independent of any statute.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728 n. 27 (“Aside from
the possibility that statutory protections can be repealed, the noncodified public trust
doctrine remains important both to confirm the state’s sovereign supervision and to
require consideration of public trust uses in cases filed directly in the courts.”);
Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho
1983) (compliance with legislative authority alone is not sufficient to determine to
determine public trust compliance).
138. See Donald Brown, Visualizing Why US National and US State Governments’
GHG Reductions Commitments Are Woefully Inadequate in Light of Recent Science,
WIDENER LAW: ETHICS AND CLIMATE (Jan. 26, 2014, 8:09 PM), http://blogs.law.
widener.edu/climate/2014/01/26/visuallizing-why-us-national-and-us-stategovernments-ghg-reductions-commitments-are-now-woefully-inadequate-in-light-ofrecent-science/. See also Juliana Complaint, supra note 55, at para. 8; Section IV.A,
infra.
139. Kootenai Envtl. All., 671 P.2d at 1095. The principle flows from the nature of
the public trust as a constitutional requirement. As such, the public trust doctrine
cannot be solely defined, nor overcome, by statutory law. The plurality opinion in
Robinson, for example, found the extensive fracking legislation passed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalid under the public trust, falling “considerably short
of meeting [the] obligation” to prevent degradation of public natural resources. The
plurality concluded: “In constitutional terms, the Act degrades the corpus of the trust.”
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 979–80 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
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fiduciary duty to protect and restore. As the Robinson plurality
opinion emphasized in the context of threats posed by fracking,
the duty of protection is active, not passive (the legislature
must “act affirmatively to protect the environment, via
legislative action”), and it applies to both direct and indirect
action:
As trustee, the Commonwealth has a duty to refrain
from permitting or encouraging the degradation,
diminution, or depletion of public natural resources,
whether such degradation, diminution, or depletion
would occur through direct state action or indirectly,
e.g., because of the state’s failure to restrain the actions
of private parties.140
A few atmospheric trust cases so far have propounded a
general duty of protection.141 But in the context of climate
action, the duty of protection and the duty of restoration must
be quantified in terms of carbon emissions reduction to have
any practical effect. As noted in Section I.B., youth plaintiffs in
atmospheric trust cases seek judicial orders requiring
governments to develop climate recovery plans that reduce
emissions within their jurisdictions in accordance with the best
available science.142 Such specific targets form the sidewalls of
the atmospheric trust remedy.143

140. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 958. While Chief Justice Castille interpreted the
Environmental Rights Amendment of that state’s constitution (which states, “As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people”), he acknowledged that the language contained only
“generalized terms.” His detailed analysis of fiduciary obligation, unspecified by the
generalized terms, thus proves instructive for cases arising in other states. Id. at 913.
See also San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal. App. 4th 202,
233–34 (2015) (The state trustee has “an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of [trust] resources, and to protect public trust
uses whenever feasible.”).
141. See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2015); see also infra Section IV (discussing Foster decision); Bosner-Lain v.
State Comm’n. on Envtl. Quality, Cause No. D-1-GN-11-002194 (Texas Dist. Ct. Aug.
2, 2012).
142. For a discussion of the Hansen team’s prescription, see Part I.A. above.
143. Some judges may feel that setting a specific trajectory of emissions reduction as
a legal obligation presents an impossible task. But courts dealing with other
fundamental rights recognize that their broad power of equity gives generous latitude
for estimation, approximation, and adjustment. For example, in a case involving
overcrowding of California prisons, a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit
candidly admitted that choosing the appropriate prison population reduction is “not an
exact science.” Ultimately the panel decided that permissible prison populations could
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Stage 3: Managing the Remedy

The third stage of ATL involves managing the remedy
within the narrow time remaining in view of looming climate
tipping points.144 Courts in atmospheric trust cases are called
upon in the same manner as they always have been in public
trust cases: not to exercise direct management over the res of
the trust, but to ensure that the political branches fulfill their
trust obligation to avoid destruction or substantial impairment
to public assets that are needed to sustain future generations.
But the sheer urgency of the climate crisis sets ATL apart from
other public trust cases and calls for more intense judicial
supervision. In the emerging tipping-point world, effective
relief depends on close oversight of climate recovery plans to
ensure their implementation according to strict time frames.
Climate trust cases have their genesis in long-standing and
severe neglect of duty by agencies. Facing deep institutional
entrenchment, judicial remands back to agencies may yield no
progress and waste considerable time as the climate window of
opportunity continues to close. Judges have the power to use
innovative tools to steer agencies back on course, similar to
strategies a bankruptcy judge might devise in asserting control
over a terribly managed company. Many tools, such as the use
of special masters, exist to enable judges to require
performance and accountability by government defendants.145
Any judicial action-forcing remedy involves two tasks:
requiring a plan of measureable steps and providing continued
oversight to ensure its proper execution. Courts have assumed
this role many times in the past when faced with severe
breakdown of agency performance. “Institutional litigation”
involves close supervision by courts over administrative
processes, an approach taken in cases involving desegregation,
treaty rights, land use, prison reform, and educational
not exceed 137.5 percent of the design capacity of the prison structure. See Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 965, 1003–04 (E.D & N.D. Cal. 2009).
144. The Magistrate Judge’s Order in Juliana v. U.S. recognized that a judicial
remedy forcing the Agency to protect the constitutional rights of plaintiffs does not
exceed the court’s appropriate role, and that the court could force an agency to craft
regulations. See Juliana Order, supra note 57, at 13–14.
145. For commentary, see Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of
Special Masters: Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235,
237 (1997) (remedy in complex litigation “is often prospective and affects large
numbers of people as would a regulation or legislative rule”).
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funding.146 Such cases characteristically exemplify judicial
vigor and innovation in addressing bureaucratic delinquency.
“Structural injunctions” emerging from such litigation can aim
prospectively, sweep broadly, and respond to a myriad of
scientific and management challenges.147 Such injunctions may
require continued jurisdiction over a case for decades. But so
far, no atmospheric trust case has reached this “structural
injunction” stage of remedial relief. In light of the narrow
window of time remaining for climate action, judges should
incorporate strict time frames into a judicial remedy for
atmospheric trust litigation.148
IV. FOSTER V. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF
ECOLOGY: A PATH-BREAKER FOR ATMOSPHERIC
TRUST LITIGATION
A.

Procedural History

In June 2014, eight youth plaintiffs in Washington
petitioned the State’s Department of Ecology (DOE) to adopt a
proposed rule that would recommend to the legislature sciencebased greenhouse gas emissions limits to stem global
warming.149 In August 2014, DOE denied the petition without
challenging the underlying science, stating that the Agency
would continue its “current approach.”150 The youths appealed
the decision to the King County Superior Court in September,
2014 on the basis that the public trust requires protection of
the climate system and essential resources.151 Just three
months later, in December 2014, as the case was pending in

146. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 48, ch. 11.
147. See Farrell, supra note 145, at 237.
148. Courts have acted with haste before in face of unprecedented urgency. See, e.g.,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the U.S. presidential election).
149. See Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology (Foster I), No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 1–2
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015).
150. Id. at 2. The Director stated: “I appreciate the concern and desire of the youth
petitioners to reduce GHG emissions for improving the environment for themselves
and future generations. However, Ecology denies your petition for rulemaking in favor
of its current approach.” Legal Updates: August 19, 2014, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST
(2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/washington.
151. See Petition for Review at 7–13, filed in Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash.
Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/WA.
PetitionForReview.pdf.
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court, the DOE issued a report to the legislature underscoring
the sheer urgency of climate action. The report stated:
Climate change is not a far off risk. It is happening now
globally and the impacts are worse than previously
predicted, and are forecast to worsen. . . . If we delay
action by even a few years, the rate of reduction needed
to stabilize the global climate would be beyond anything
achieved historically and would be more costly.152
On June 23, 2015, Judge Hollis Hill issued an opinion in
Foster v. DOE that amounted to a significant victory for the
youth plaintiffs. Characterizing the “Imminent Threat of
Global Warming,” the opinion quoted extensively from the
December 2014 report to describe both the urgency of climate
change and its projected damage, which includes sea level rise,
ocean acidification, glacier and snowpack loss, floods, droughts,
wildfires, landslides, and coastal and storm damage.153 The
court wrote, “Despite this urgent call to action, based on
science it does not dispute, Ecology’s recommendation in this
report is, ‘that no changes be made to the state’s statutory
emission limits at this time.’” Based on both the December
2014 report and a declaration by climate scientist Dr. Pushker
Kharecha that the plaintiffs submitted in their opening brief to
the court, Judge Hill ordered DOE to reconsider its denial of
the youth plaintiffs’ petition.154 Holding the agency defendant
to a tight time frame, Judge Hill ordered DOE to report back to
the court within two weeks (by July 8, 2015) with its decision
on reconsideration.155
In July, while the DOE was reviewing the petition anew, the
plaintiffs leveraged the favorable ruling in Foster v. DOE to
plead their case to Washington Governor Jay Inslee. Just
eleven days after his meeting with the youths, the Governor
issued a directive ordering the DOE to initiate new GHG notice

152. See Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 2 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology, Washington
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Limits, Prepared Under RCW 70.235.040 (Dec.
2014) [hereinafter December 2014 Report]).
153. Id. at 2–3 (quoting December 2014 Report).
154. Id. at 4. Dr. Kharecha is a co-author of the prescription issued by the
international team of scientists assembled by Dr. Hansen. The court denied the State’s
motion to strike these two pieces of new evidence (both produced after the State’s
decision denying youth’s petition), finding “that this new evidence relates to the
validity of the agency action at the time it was taken.” Id.
155. See id. at 1–4.
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and comment rulemaking.156 The move toward new air quality
regulation effectively granted the procedural relief that the
Foster plaintiffs sought. In his directive, Governor Inslee
wrote, “Washington must do more to meet its obligation to
reduce emissions of carbon pollution. We need to act
purposefully and swiftly to reduce the threats posed by climate
change to the health, safety, and economic prosperity of
Washingtonians.”157
In August 2015, the DOE notified the court that it had again
denied the youths’ petition because Governor Inslee’s directive
had initiated the rulemaking as plaintiffs were requesting.158
The youth plaintiffs nevertheless appealed the denial to
superior court, seeking a ruling to declare that their public
trust rights include the right to a stable atmosphere. The
youths also sought a declaration that the new GHG rule should
be based on science. As part of this appeal, the plaintiffs
submitted a declaration by Dr. James Hansen underscoring
the climate emergency.
On November 19, 2015, Judge Hill issued her second opinion
in Foster v. DOE . Because the rulemaking process sought by
the youths had already commenced following the Governor’s
directive, the court upheld DOE’s denial.159 The court could
have ended the matter there—because relief initially sought by
the youths was already underway—but instead, Judge Hill
proceeded to declare strong parameters defining the State’s
duty to protect the atmosphere under the public trust doctrine.
These declarations, discussed below, form a ground-breaking
development in efforts to establish a constitutional climate
trust responsibility. The strength of these pioneering principles
notwithstanding, Judge Hill dismissed the case in view of
DOE’s commenced rulemaking. Understandably, it seemed
that the plaintiffs had already received that portion of the
156. See In Advance of Paris Climate Talks, Washington Court Recognizes
Constitutional and Public Trust Rights and Announces Agency’s Legal Duty to Protect
Atmosphere for Present and Future Generations, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Nov. 19,
2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.11.20WADecisionPR.pdf.
157. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015)
(quoting Letter from Governor Jay Inslee to Maia Bellon, Dir. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology
(August 13, 2015)).
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. at 10 (“[T]he petition for review is DENIED due to the Department of
Ecology having commenced the aforementioned rulemaking process as directed by the
Governor.”).
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requested remedy outside of court.
But time proved otherwise. Just three months after the
dismissal, and free from judicial supervision, DOE dropped its
rulemaking process. The move provoked the youth plaintiffs to
respond: “Ecology’s decision . . . has wasted copious amounts of
time, has betrayed the trust of the youth, and continues to
violate our constitutional rights.”160 The plaintiffs’ attorneys
went back to court and filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief to
vacate the portion of the earlier decision dismissing their case
against DOE. Such a motion requires a showing of
“extraordinary circumstances.”161 The plaintiffs essentially
asked the court to resume jurisdiction over the case and take it
into the remedial stage (the third stage described above).
Judge Hill did just that, and reiterating the undisputed
threats from climate destruction, she said from the bench:
This is an extraordinary circumstance that we are
facing here. . . . The reason I’m doing this is because
this is an urgent situation. This is not a situation [in
which] these children can wait. . . . Polar bears can’t
wait, the people of Bangladesh can’t wait. I don’t have
jurisdiction over their needs in this matter, but I do
have jurisdiction in this court, and for that reason I’m
taking this action.162
She ordered DOE to follow through and finalize its
emissions reduction rule by the end of 2016, and to submit
recommendations to the legislature on science-based
reductions for the 2017 legislative session.163 Judge Hill also
directed DOE to consult with the plaintiffs before making the
recommendations to the legislature.164

160. See State of Washington Delays Action on Climate Change—Again: Department
of Ecology Abandons Proposed Greenhouse Gas Rule, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Mar. 2,
2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/16.03.02EcologyRuleWithdrawal.
pdf.
161. See Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Relief Under CR 60(b) at 1, Foster III, No.
14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. May 16, 2016).
162. Transcript of Hearing at 20, Foster III, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.
May 3, 2016).
163. See Youths Secure Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises
State, Rules From Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, OUR
CHILDREN’S TRUST (Apr. 29, 2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.
04.29WAFinalRulingPR.pdf.
164. Foster III, at 3.
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B.

Significance

Two opinions emerged from the Foster litigation prior to the
latest order from the court that reassumed jurisdiction over
the DOE. Although succinct, both opinions represent clarifying
and forceful pronouncements in the burgeoning field of
atmospheric trust litigation and may well break ground for
court opinions in pending and future public trust cases in other
states and nations. Most profoundly, Judge Hill declared an
atmospheric public trust responsibility of constitutional
magnitude in a context framed by urgency, severe danger to
humanity, and agency recalcitrance.
1.

Recognizing Climate Urgency and the Threat to Human
Survival

Until the Foster decision, no court had underscored the
urgency of climate disruption and the magnitude of the threat
it presents to future generations Judge Hill did not shy away
from the gravity of the situation. She stated:
Plaintiffs assert, the Department does not dispute, and
this court finds, that current scientific evidence
establishes that rapidly increasing global warming
causes an unprecedented risk to earth, including land,
sea, the atmosphere and all living plants and
creatures. . . . In fact, as Petitioners assert and this
court finds, their very survival depends upon the will of
their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocally, to
stem the tide of global warming by accelerating the
reduction of emissions of GHG’s before doing so becomes
first too costly and then too late.165
In an introductory section of the opinion entitled, “The
Imminent Threat of Global Warming,” Judge Hill
characterized the political delay that led to the case, stating:
[F]rustrated by a historical lack of political will to
respond adequately to the increasingly urgent and dire
acceleration of global warming, eight youth petitioners
[have] submitted a petition for rulemaking . . . [and]
assert, consistent with the December 2014 report, that
prompt decisive action by Ecology is necessary to
165. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 4–5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015)
(emphasis added).
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protect from climate change and ocean acidification the
state’s natural resources and the children who depend
on them.166
As observed above, a court’s stance is likely determined not
only by the urgency and gravity of the threat but also by the
judge’s perception as to the adequacy of a response from the
other branches of government, the branches charged with
protecting the environment. Typically, government defendants
allege that their regulatory processes suffice to address the
problem, and often courts defer to those branches even though
the plaintiffs allege that the climate response by those
branches remains shockingly insufficient.167 In Foster, the
court’s approach to interpreting the plaintiff’s public trust
rights was likely influenced by the laggard response from the
other branches of government. Judge Hill had to look no
further than the DOE’s own December 2014 report to find the
Agency’s response wholly inadequate. She stated:
The scientific evidence is clear that the current rates of
reduction mandated by Washington law cannot achieve
the GHG reductions necessary to protect our
environment and to ensure the survival of an
environment in which Petitioners can grow to adulthood
safely. In fact, in its 2014 report to the legislature the
Department stated, “Washington’s existing statutory
limits should be adjusted to better reflect the current
science. The limits need to be more aggressive in order
for Washington to do its part to address climate
risks.”168
2.

Declaring the Atmosphere as a Public Trust Asset

The Foster opinion clearly announced the atmosphere as a
public trust asset. While not the first case to recognize an
atmospheric trust, Judge Hill’s opinion directly renounced a
166. Id. at 3.
167. See, e.g., Appellants Brief at 2–3, Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,
No. 33,110 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2014), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/
NMOpeningBrief.pdf (“Despite reports by [federal and state] agencies . . . acknowledging
the impacts of climate change in New Mexico that result from human-caused greenhouse
gas emissions, the State was taking no measures to address the human causes of climate
change in New Mexico and in fact repealed New Mexico’s existing greenhouse gas
regulations.”); see also Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 5.
168. Foster II, at 5.
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traditional argument routinely brought up by government
attorneys; namely, because the foundational cases in the field
dealt primarily with navigable waters and their streambeds,
the public trust is limited to those resources.169 Noting the
obvious scientific link between navigable waters and
atmosphere, Judge Hill tersely rejected the State’s argument:
[Defendant DOE] argues that since the Public Trust
Doctrine has not been expanded by the courts beyond
protection of navigable waters it cannot be applied to
protection of the “atmosphere.” But this misses the
point since current science makes clear that global
warming is impacting the acidification of the oceans to
alarming and dangerous levels, thus endangering the
bounty of our navigable waters. . . . The navigable
waters and the atmosphere are intertwined and to argue
a separation of the two, or to argue that GHG emissions
do not affect navigable waters is nonsensical.170
The Foster court is the first to definitively link GHG
emissions with ocean acidification. The connection suggests the
viability of an ATL approach to the crisis of ocean acidification:
after all, the same redress sought for climate disruption
(climate recovery plans that force carbon dioxide emissions
reduction) remains necessary to abate the marine damage. The
Foster court’s approach of looking to science and recognizing
the reality of ecological connection to define the trust finds
company in one of the nation’s leading public trust decisions,
In re Water Use Permit Applications (commonly called the
Waiahole Ditch decision).171 In that case, the Hawaii Supreme
Court rejected the State’s argument that the trust protected
navigable waters but did not extend to ground waters.
Dismissing any separation between the two, that court stated:
Modern science and technology have discredited the
surface-ground dichotomy. Few cases highlight more
plainly its diminished meaning and utility than the
present one, involving surface streams depleted by
ground water diversions and underground aquifers

169. See, e.g., Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273 at 8–12 (Or. Cir.
Ct. May 11, 2015).
170. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015)
(emphasis added).
171. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P. 3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
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recharged by surface water applications. In determining
the scope of the sovereign reservation, therefore, we see
little sense in adhering to artificial distinctions neither
recognized by the ancient system nor borne out in the
present practical realities of this state.172
3.

Declaring the Constitutional Public Trust Duty

Framing the law against climate urgency, the Foster court
unequivocally declared a constitutional public trust duty to
protect the atmosphere and climate system, stating:
[T]he State has a constitutional obligation to protect the
public’s interest in natural resources held in trust for
the common benefit of the people of the State . . . . If
ever there were a time to recognize through action this
right to preservation of a healthful and pleasant
atmosphere, the time is now.173
Notably, the court grounded the duty in two separate parts
of the constitution, both of which have applicability to other
states.
a.

The Constitutional Duty to Protect the Atmosphere as Part
of the Sovereign Trust Ownership of Submerged Lands

First, the Foster court found a constitutional public trust
duty embodied in Article XVII of the Washington Constitution,
which declares state ownership of the beds and shores of
navigable waters.174 Recognizing that the atmosphere and
submerged lands remain inextricably connected, the court held
that this part of the state constitution also requires the

172. Id. at 445. (emphasis added).
173. Foster II, at 8–9. Framing the right to a healthy atmosphere as a constitutional
right, the court again underscored the urgency of climate crisis by citing the December
2014 Washington DOE report that stated: “Climate change is not a far off risk. It is
happening now globally and the impacts are worse than previously predicted, and are
forecast to worsen . . . If we delay action by even a few years, the rate of reduction
needed to stabilize the global climate would be beyond anything achieved historically.”
Id. at 9 (quoting WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
REDUCTION LIMITS (2014)). The court recognized that the climate protection duty is
also grounded in the Clean Air Act. See id. at 6 (“This mandatory duty must be
understood in the context not just of the Clean Air Act itself but in recognition of the
Washington State Constitution and the Public Trust Doctrine.”).
174. Id. at 7.
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government to protect the atmosphere.175 Such analysis also
provides a constitutional approach to ocean acidification, which
is caused by carbon dioxide emissions. The analysis should
apply in other states because it is well settled that, as a matter
of the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine, all states
own navigable beds and waterways in trust for the people.176
Scores of cases already make clear that such trust ownership
imposes a duty of protection on states to protect the
streambeds and waters.177 The Foster opinion took the duty a
step further and applied it to atmosphere by recognizing the
ecological chain of causation between atmospheric GHG
pollution and the condition of streambeds and waterways.178
b.

The Constitutional Duty to Protect the Atmosphere as Part
of the Reserved Inalienable Rights Secured by the State
Constitution

In a separate section of the opinion, Judge Hill made clear
DOE’s “responsibility to protect fundamental and inalienable
rights protected by the Washington State Constitution.”179
Drawing from Article 1, Section 30, which states that “[t]he
enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
others retained by the people,” the court announced a “right to
preservation of a healthful and pleasant atmosphere. . . .”180
While notably succinct, the opinion amounts to an important
refrain of the landmark Pennsylvania Robinson opinion
described above, in which Chief Justice Castille declared a

175. Id. at 8.
176. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845) (describing the equal footing
doctrine); PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (holding that the origin
of equal footing doctrine is the U.S. Constitution); Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001)
(discussing the equal footing doctrine as it applies to navigable waters); United States
v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) (same).
177. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719–
22 (Cal. 1983) (non-navigable tributaries); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d
409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (all waters); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838–39 (S.D.
2004) (all waters); San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 242 Cal.
App. 4th 202, 232–34 (2015) (submerged lands, tidewaters, and navigable streams);
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379–80 (Cal. 1971) (tidelands); Just v. Marinette
Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768–69 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City
of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (tidelands).
178. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 9.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/14

44

Wood and Woodward: Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a He

2016]

ATL: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AT LAST

677

constitutional right to a healthful environment embedded in
the social contract between citizens and their government.181
The Foster court described the right as “fundamental and
inalienable,” and referred to Article 1 of the Washington
Constitution, which reserves fundamental rights to the
citizens. The approach parallels the Robinson court’s
articulation of “inherent and indefeasible” environmental
rights located in Article 1 of that state’s constitution, which
preserves the people’s right to clean air and pure water.182 The
plaintiffs in Foster relied heavily on the Robinson case to
promote a constitutional understanding of the public trust.183
The Foster court’s pronouncement of an inherent right to a
healthy atmosphere should have value in ATL cases brought in
other states. The same reserved rights of citizens are secured
in other state constitutions.184 Article I of the Oregon
Constitution, for example, (like Pennsylvania’s constitution)
expressly reserves power “inherent in the people.”185 Moreover,
the pending ATL case against multiple federal agencies in the
Obama Administration, Juliana v. U.S., relies on both the
public trust and federal constitutional protections of due
process and equal protection, all of which are illuminated by

181. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947–49 (Pa. 2013) (plurality
opinion).
182. See id. (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 provision that all citizens “’have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights.’”). The Robinson plurality made clear that, while
Pennsylvania amended its constitution to provide express protection for natural
resources, the environmental rights held by citizens pre-existed that amendment. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
183. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.
Mar. 16, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/ATL.Opening%20Brief.
Final_.3.16.14.pdf; see also Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for
Declaratory Relief, Chernaik ex rel. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 161109271 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 9, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.01.09.OR_.PlsMotforSJ.
pdf.
184. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Rights of Individuals. All
persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable rights.”);
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1 (“Equal Rights. All men are possessed of equal and
inalienable natural rights. . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All individuals are by nature
equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty.”).
185. Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 with PA. CONST. art I, § 2. See also supra note 83
(quoting Oregon constitution). For further discussion, see Torres & Bellinger, supra
note 79.
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reserved inherent rights analysis.186 The magistrate judge
recommended that the district court affirm, in the climate
context, the validity of both separate constitutional rights and
federal public trust rights embedded in substantive due
process protections. By presenting a constitutional basis for the
atmospheric trust duty, plaintiffs can urge courts to fully
scrutinize agency action taken pursuant to a statute. Under
this approach, plaintiffs can challenge the underlying statutes
as constitutionally deficient when they fail to adequately
address carbon emissions.
4.

The Mandatory and Active Nature of the Public Trust Duty

The Foster court made clear that the public trust duty of
protection is both mandatory and active, stating, “[T]he Public
Trust Doctrine mandates that the State act through its
designated agency to protect what it holds in trust.”187
Importantly, Judge Hill did not simply presume that just any
rule addressing GHG emissions would fulfill that duty.
Instead, Judge Hill looked further and noted that the existing
GHG rule was not sufficient to fulfill the public trust duty,
stating: “[T]he emissions standards currently adopted by
Ecology do not fulfill the mandate to ‘[p]reserve, protect and
enhance the air quality for current and future generations.’”188
She noted that the regulations then in place addressed only a
portion of the pollution sources, while not addressing
transportation sources that amount to forty-four percent of the
total annual state emissions.189 She concluded: “One need only
go back to Ecology’s pronouncement in the December 2014
report to appreciate the inadequacy of its current efforts to
preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality for current and

186. See, e.g., Juliana Complaint, supra note 55. In a prior federal atmospheric trust
case brought by youth plaintiffs against the U.S. government, law professors from
across the nation submitted an amicus brief explaining the relationship between
reserved legislative powers, inherent rights of citizens, and the Due Process and Equal
Protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. For the expanded draft version of the
brief, see John Davidson, Draft Atmospheric Trust Litigation Amicus Brief, SSRN 2–
40 (Nov. 30, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361780.
187. Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
188. Id. at 6 (citing statutory duty, which the court emphasized “must be
understood” in the context of the state constitution and public trust doctrine as well).
189. Id. at 6–7.
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future generations.”190
It remains to be seen whether, under the court’s resumed
jurisdiction, DOE will promulgate a rule that reflects
scientifically proscribed rates of emissions reduction. If not, the
youth plaintiffs may ask the court to evaluate the sufficiency of
the regulation. However, the scrutiny given to DOE’s prior rule
is worth noting, for it indicates a judicial willingness to
evaluate the adequacy of a regulation at least in terms of the
sources it covers. By finding the regulation deficient because it
failed to address the transportation sector, the court indicated
its understanding that a macro approach is needed to address
the problem of GHG reduction across a given jurisdiction.
Indeed, a major advantage of ATL is its demand for a macro
analysis of the asset as a whole, which is quite different than a
traditional statutory approach requiring only incremental
actions. The ATL suits seek a full climate recovery plan that
forces GHG emissions reduction on an annual basis according
to the best available science. The Foster case provides some
judicial endorsement of such a full-scale approach.191
Moreover, and equally important, the opinion shows that
science must be a part of the rulemaking process, although the
question of how science will be balanced against economic,
social, and political concerns must wait for another day.192 At
this stage, the important feature to note is that this court
allowed plaintiffs to submit declarations from some of the
leading climate scientists in the world, and the court made
clear throughout both opinions its respect for scientific
explanations and the need for science-based action.
Presumably, the statement in Dr. Jim Hansen’s declaration
finding the State’s existing statutory GHG reduction
requirements “scientifically unsupported” had bearing on the
court’s decision.193
190. Id. at 7.
191. The opinion, however, did not force the State to base its new rulemaking on
science alone, as asked by the plaintiffs. See infra note 192.
192. See Foster II, at 9 (“Now that Ecology has commenced rulemaking to establish
greenhouse emission standards taking into account science as well as economic, social
and political considerations, it cannot be found to be acting arbitrarily or
capriciously.”).
193. See Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen at 9, Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA
(Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.08.
25.WAResponseShowCauseOrder-HansenDecl.pdf (noting that scientific reports “are
centrally relevant to the question now before [the court], namely, whether Ecology is
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5.

A Judicially Supervised Remedy

Judge Hill’s decision to resume jurisdiction over the Foster
case (by vacating the earlier order dismissing the case), and
her imposition of strict time frames for rulemaking, represent
precisely the time-sensitive and decisive judicial approach
necessary to spur a necessary government climate response.
Judge Hill’s statement from the bench—notably: “The kids
can’t wait”—clearly indicated the court’s sense of urgency.194
The same sense of urgency was manifest in earlier phases of
the case. After finding in June, 2015, that the DOE had
wrongly dismissed the youth’s petition for a rulemaking, the
court gave the Agency just two weeks in which to conduct its
reconsideration of the matter and report back to court.195 The
court also displayed disapproval of the Agency’s prior delay in
reporting to the legislature on climate (the report was
submitted in December, 2014, four months after the
deadline).196 If atmospheric trust litigation is to succeed in
forcing carbon reduction, judges must require climate recovery
plans within strict deadlines set by the court. The Foster
decisions show a strong judicial inclination in that direction.
Additionally, the halting nature of this lawsuit demonstrates
well the need for continued jurisdiction. Agencies caught in the
maelstrom of politics are likely to ignore court-ordered
remedies, as here, where, upon the court’s dismissal, DOE
simply dropped the court-ordered rulemaking process. When
Judge Hill resumed jurisdiction over the case in May 2016, she
declared from the bench: “I’m not confident at this point that
the rulemaking procedure will be completed by the end of 2016
without a court order.”197

entitled to slow-dance towards compliance with the scientifically-unsupported
emissions reductions in RCW 70.235.020 while the planet burns. . . . [F]ossil fuel
emission phase out must be commenced without further delay. Indeed, much further
delay can only consign our children and their progeny to a very different, far less
hospitable, planet.”).
194. See Youths Secure Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises
State, Rules From Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, OUR
CHILDREN’S TRUST (Apr. 29, 2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.
04.29WAFinalRulingPR.pdf.
195. See Foster I, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015).
196. See Foster II, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at 3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015)
(noting failure of Ecology to meet deadline).
197. Transcript of Hearing at 20, Foster II.
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Moreover, by basing the right to a stable atmosphere in the
state constitution, the Foster case may have forged important
ground in creating a judicial interface with the legislature at
the remedy stage, particularly when new legislation may be
required to produce a state carbon recovery plan. In her last
ruling, Judge Hill ordered DOE to develop legislative
recommendations. A high-profile case in Washington State,
McCleary v. State, provides a striking example of a legislative
remand and continuing judicial supervision in the context of
enforcing another constitutional right held by youth—the right
to a public education.198 In that case, after protracted litigation
finding that the legislature failed to meet its constitutional
obligation to fund public education, the Washington Supreme
Court ordered the legislature to develop a plan with a concrete
phase-in schedule for funding the various components of public
education.199 When the legislature failed to arrive at an
adequate plan, the court unanimously found the State in
contempt of court, warning that, if the legislature did not take
actions sufficient to purge the order by the end of the 2015
legislative session, the court would reconvene and impose
specific sanctions. Later, after the 2015 legislative session
concluded, the court unanimously imposed fines of $100,000
per day on the State of Washington for failing to comply with
its order. While the court acknowledged “significant progress
in some key areas” had been made to fund education, it found
that the State had still not developed a plan to fully fund
education. The court emphasized that:
[I]t will not dictate the details of how the State is to
achieve full funding of basic education[,] . . . [but] in
accordance with its obligation to enforce the commands
of the Washington Constitution, and pursuant to its
continuing jurisdiction over this matter to ensure
steady progress towards constitutional compliance, the
court has only required, and still requires, the State to
present its plan for achieving compliance by its own
deadline of 2018.200

198. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012).
199. Order at 8, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.
courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/20140109_843627_
McClearyOrder.pdf.
200. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
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The approach—presumably made accessible to Washington’s
ATL litigation through Foster’s declaration of a constitutional
right to a healthy atmosphere—could provide guidance for
judicial supervision of climate recovery plans in the future.
While the McCleary decision was rendered for a totally
different context than climate, the Washington Supreme Court
illuminated the appropriate role of courts in areas of
constitutional enforcement that require an active legislative
response:
[A]s the court has repeatedly stated, it does not wish to
dictate the means by which the legislature carries out
its constitutional responsibility or otherwise directly
involve itself in the choices and trade-offs that are
uniquely within the legislature’s purview. Rather, the
court has fulfilled its constitutional role to determine
whether the State is violating constitutional commands,
and having held that it is, the court has issued orders
within its authority directing the State to remedy its
violation, deferring to the legislature to determine the
details. These orders are not advisory or designed only
to get the legislature’s “attention”; the court expects
them to be obeyed even though they are directed to a
coordinate branch of government. When the orders are
not followed, contempt is the lawful and proper means
of enforcement in the orderly administration of
justice.201
An equally vigorous degree of judicial supervision and
engagement is warranted in the context of a climate emergency
brought on by decades of legislative recalcitrance and delay in
regulating GHG emissions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The atmosphere and oceans remain quintessential public
trust resources that all governments have a fundamental duty
to protect. Unprecedented and irrevocable harm hangs in the
balance of the atmospheric trust litigation cases filed across
the United States and in other countries. Courts remain both
well situated and fully obligated to prevent environmental
201. See Order at 4, McCleary v. State, 2014 Wash. LEXIS 898 (Wash. Sept. 11,
2014), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84
362-7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf.
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agencies from ignoring the carbon dioxide emissions that
threaten human life, welfare, and, ultimately, civilization
itself.
The window of opportunity to stave off climate tipping points
has nearly closed. The youth plaintiffs in ATL cases ask judges
to apply public trust principles as courts have done for over
two centuries—to protect the natural resources that citizens
rely on for their survival and well-being. Framed by the sense
of urgency and the gravity of the youth’s survival interests, the
Foster decisions advanced the growing field of atmospheric
trust litigation by making clear a constitutional duty to protect
the atmosphere.
If there remains a habitable planet at the end of the century,
it may well be because extraordinary jurists across the world
rose to their constitutional role and vindicated the rights of
young people as beneficiaries of the public trust at a time when
action could still be taken before climate tipping points
rendered such efforts moot. Future generations may look back
to the Foster case as a principled legal turning point in the
climate battle—and a heroic decision handed down to the ages.
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